Some answers but I need to show work

1) Q= 76/3

2) Q=24

3) Q=55/2 Need by 7/2/13 at 5pm mountain time

Question 1: Solve for the Nash equilibrium quantities of the following two firm, Cournot game: Market Demand: Q(p) = 42 -2p. C1(q1) = C2(q2) = 2q: Also give the price and firm profits at the equilibrium quantities.

Question 2: Solve for the Nash equilibrium quantities of the following two firrm, Cournot game: Market Demand: Q(p) = 42 -2p. C1(q1) = 2q1;C2(q2) = 4q2: Also give the price and firm profits at the equilibrium quantities.

Question 3: Solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium quantities of the following two firm Stackelberg game: Market Demand: Q(p) = 42 -2p. C1(q1) = 2q1;C2(q2) = 4q2: Also give the price and firm profits at the equilibrium quantities. How do these compare to those in Question 2? Why?

Question 4: Using the market demand and cost function of Question 1, provide the Nash equilibrium prices of the Bertrand model and explain why neither firm has an incentive to deviate.

Question 5: Using the market demand and cost functions of Question 2, provide the Nash equilibrium prices of the Bertrand model and explain why neither firm has an incentive to deviate.

Optional Information: Subject: econ game theory